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LAMPARELLO V. FALWELL
420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005)
FACTS
Christopher Lamparello registered and maintains a website that is
critical of Jerry Falwell at the domain name "www.fallwell.com."1  Jerry
Falwell is a well-known minister who regularly contributes commentary on
politics and public affairs, including observations regarding homosexuality.2
After hearing an interview in which Falwell expressed certain views on
homosexuals which Lamparello considered offensive, Lamparello created a
website criticizing Falwell's views and "untruths about gay people" and
providing alternative facts, scriptural interpretations, and links to other
resources.3 While the website at one time included a link to an Amazon.com
webpage, Lamparello's website never sold any goods or services.4 Falwell
holds common law trademarks for "Jerry Falwell," "Falwell," and "Listen
America with Jerry Falwell." Falwell's website, "www.falwell.com,"
receives about 9,000 hits per day, while Lamparello's receives 200 per day.
5
In October 2001 and June 2003, Falwell sent Lamparello letters
demanding that he stop using "www.fallwell.com" or any similar variation of
his name.6 Lamparello filed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement
against Falwell and Jerry Falwell Ministries.7 Falwell filed counter-claims
for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000); false designation
of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. §
1126 and the common law of Virginia; and cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d). 8 The district court noted that no separate cause of action under 15
U.S.C. § 1126 existed for Falwell that was not covered under his 15 U.S.C. §
1125 claim.9  Furthermore, since the likelihood of confusion test for
trademark infringement and unfair competition is essentially the same under
Virginia law and the Lanham Act, the state-law claim rose or fell with the
federal claim so the court needed only analyze the federal claim.'0





6 Id. at 312.
7 Id. Jerry Falwell Ministries is an organization that runs a number of Christian service
programs and institutions, including Liberty University, The Old Time Gospel Hour, The Liberty
Godparent Home for Unwed Mothers, and The National Liberty Journal Newspaper. Jerry Falwell
Ministries, Mission Statement, http://www.falwell.com/aboutus2.php (lasted visited Oct. 15, 2006).
8 Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 2005).
9 Id. at 312 n.1.
10 Id. The Lanham Act is the popular name referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., dealing with
the law of trademarks, including 15 U.S.C. § 1114 dealing with limitations of remedies for causes of
185
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Both parties filed cross-motions in the district court for summary
judgment, stipulating to all relevant facts." The district court granted
summary judgment for Falwell, enjoined Lamparello from using Falwell's
mark at "www.fallwell.com," and ordered Lamparello to turn the domain
name over to Falwell.12 However, the district court did not grant Falwell's
request for statutory damages or attorney fees, finding that Lamparello's
primary motive in establishing the site was to publish opinions contrary to
Falwell's and was not to divert money or profits.' 3 Lamparello appealed the
judgment and Falwell appealed the denial of statutory damages and attorney
fees.' 4 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a three judge panel, held 3-0
that Lamparello's website did not constitute trademark infringement or false
designation of origin because it was clear that there was no likelihood of
confusion between Lamparello's and Falwell's sites.' 5  In addition,
Lamparello's website did not violate cybersquatting law, because Lamparello
had not exhibited a bad faith intent to profit by attempting to sell the website
to Falwell.' 6 Lamparello was awarded summary judgment on all counts,




The court first addressed the issue of trademark infringement and
false designation of origin. Lamparello contended that the Lanham Act
should apply only to "commercial speech" in order to ensure that the Act
does not encroach upon First Amendment rights. 18  While the court
recognized that two recent amendments to the Act made exceptions for
noncommercial usage in order to protect First Amendment concerns, the
court noted the absence of such language in the provisions for trademark
action under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), referring to civil actions including false designation of origin, and (d),
referring to cyberpiracy prevention, which includes cybersquatting.




IS Id. at 311,318.
16 Id. at 321-22.
17 Id. at 322 & 322 n.8.
18 Id. at 313.
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infringement and false designation of origin.' 9 The court also pointed out
that websites "need not actually sell goods or services" to violate trademark
infringement or false designation of origin.20 However, the court stated that
it was unnecessary to resolve the "commercial speech" question presented by
Lamparello's argument, because Falwell's claims failed for the more
fundamental reason that there was no likelihood of confusion.2'
The Fourth Circuit held that it is permissible to use a competitor's
mark if there is no likelihood of confusion.2 2 In Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple,23 the court laid out seven factors that can help determine the
existence of a likelihood of confusion, although these factors are not always
relevant or equally weighed: "(a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark;
(b) the similarity of the two marks; (c) the similarity of the goods/services the
marks identify; (d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their
businesses; (e) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; (f)
the defendant's intent; (g) actual confusion." , Looking at the first three
factors, the court stated that while Falwell's mark is distinctive and the
domain name of Lamparello's website bears a close resemblance to
Falwell's, Lamparello's site does not look anything like Falwell's. 25 Falwell
did not argue that Lamparello's site advertised or conducted business, or that
such advertising was similar to his own.26 Lamparello only intended his site
to be a forum of criticism.27 Finally, the two sites provide opposing ideas
such that no one who entered one site would be misled into believing it was
authorized by the other.28  Hence, it was clear, as Falwell conceded at oral
argument, that no evidence existed that there was a likelihood of confusion
between the two sites.
29
19 Id. at 313-14.
20 Id. at 314 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365
(4th Cir. 2001)).
21 Id. at 314.
22 Id. at 314.
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984). In Pizzeria, Pizzeria Uno
Corporation filed suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition against Temple for registering
the restaurant name, "Taco Uno." Id. at 1524-25. The Fourth Circuit examined the claim under the seven
factors for trademark infringement. Id. at 1527-31. The court found that the mark was distinctive, the
two companies served the same purpose and had similar advertising, and that Temple's intent was of no
import if the court found a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1534-35. Despite finding a likelihood of
confusion, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief, but without prejudice. Id. at
1535-36. Since Pizzeria Uno Corp. had not penetrated the geographic area where Temple was setting up
his business, injunctive relief was not appropriate. Id.
24 Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Pizzeria, 747 F.2d at
1527).
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Falwell, however, tried to argue his claim under the "initial interest
confusion" doctrine, which forbids a competitor to lure customers by
misleading himself as another even if the confusion is dispelled before the
consummation of any sale.30 Falwell argued that this doctrine was adopted
by the court in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney
(PETA)31 and requires the court to simply compare his mark with
Lamparello's domain name, "www.fallwell.com," without any consideration
of content.32 The court rejected Falwell's argument, indicating that PETA
had neither adopted the "initial interest confusion" doctrine nor retreated
from the court's practice of examining the use of a mark in its entirety to
decide the question of likelihood of confusion. 33  Moreover, the "initial
interest confusion" doctrine would not resolve the case in Falwell's favor,
because application of the doctrine has been limited to cases involving use of
another's mark for financial gain, which is absent in the case of a free
website.34 Furthermore, the court noted that utilizing such a test here would
allow a party to insulate itself from criticism, which is not an appropriate use
of the Lanham Act.35  In determining the likelihood of confusion when
dealing with a critical website that has no financial impact, both the allegedly
infringing domain name and the underlying content of the site must be
examined.36
Next, the court considered Falwell's cybersquatting claim. A
cybersquatting claim has two elements: (1) the owner of the site "had a bad
faith intent to profit from using the domain name" and (2) the domain name
"is identical or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the distinctive and
famous mark. 37  The court pointed out that the anti-cybersquatting
legislation was enacted to eliminate the problem of individuals registering
hundreds of domain names to sell them to the highest bidder, but was not
30 Id. at 315-16.
31 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001).
In PETA, Doughney registered the domain name "www.peta.org," for "People Eating Tasty Animals." Id.
at 362. PETA sued Doughney for trademark infringement, unfair competition, service mark dilution, and
cybersquatting. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Doughney's parody
defense to the violation of trademark infringement for likelihood of confusion. Id. at 367. A parody
requires the simultaneous conveyance of two messages: (1) that it is the original, and (2) that it is not the
original, but instead is a parody. Id. at 366. While the content of the site may have conveyed the second
message, Doughney's domain name, www.peta.org, conveyed only the first message. Id. An alleged
parody that does not convey the second message is vulnerable to a claim of trademark infringement,
because of the likelihood of confusion. Id.
32 Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
33 Id.
3 Id. at 317.
35 Id. at 317-18.
36 Id. at 318.
37 Id.
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enacted to prohibit noncommercial use of domain names.38 Noncommercial
uses, such as critical websites with free access, are beyond the scope of the
Act.39  In determining the difference between abusive and legitimate
registration of domain names, the statute provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors that may be a guide in deciding whether the registration of the site
was motivated by a bad faith intent to profit.4° The court, relying on the
guidance of four of the statute's factors, found that Lamparello did not have a
bad faith intent to profit: Lamparello's purpose was to criticize Falwell's
views and did not give a financial return (Factor IV); there was no likelihood
of confusion (Factor V); Lamparello had made no attempt nor expressed any
interest in selling his site to Falwell (Factor VI); and Lamparello did not
register multiple domain names (Factor VIII). 4' In fact, the court found that
Lamparello's website for "comment and criticism" is precisely the type of




39 Id. at 318-19.
40 Id. at 319-20 (noting that the factors are a guide to the court's deliberations in determining bad
faith intent to profit (citing Lucas Nursery and Landscaping v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir.
2004))). The statue's nonexhaustive list of factors are:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name
that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(HI) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide
offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the
domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a site
accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner
or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain
name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information when
applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisitions of multiple domain names which the person
knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of
the registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at
the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the
parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or
is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section.
Id. at 319 (citing 15 U.S.C. I I25(d)(1)(B)(i)).
41 Id. at 320-21.
42 Id. at 32 1.
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CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court denied Falwell's petition for writ
of certiorari on April 17, 2006, leaving the Fourth Circuit's decision intact.43
The Fourth Circuit was clear in conveying its belief that, in general,
the likelihood of confusion doctrine protects First Amendment rights in the
realm of trademark infringement. 44  The court also distinguished the
likelihood of confusion doctrine that governs violations of trademark
infringement from, and not to be conflated with, an evaluation of a parody
defense.45 As in the case of Lamparello's website, it is a defense to a
trademark infringement for likelihood of confusion, if the mark
simultaneously conveys both the message that the mark is the original and
that it is not the original, but actually a parody.46 Hence, the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed its approach to evaluating a parody defense, which Falwell
alleged was abandoned in PETA, and declared that when determining a
likelihood of confusion between domain names "a court must evaluate an
allegedly infringing domain name in conjunction with the content of the
website identified by the domain name.' '47 This distinction is important
because the standard used to establish a parody defense is higher than that to
show trademark infringement.
While protecting trademarks is important to commerce and the
quality of goods in the market, the protection afforded to trademarks is not as
fundamental to our legal and social structure as the freedoms established in
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has noted that "the extent to
which the [Lanham] Act may be read to apply to noncommercial speech is
limited., 48 Freedom of speech is not more limited just because copyright or
trademark issues may be implicated. Moreover, copyright and trademark
claims cannot be used as a way of stifling noncommercial speech.
One issue that the reasoning of this case does not specifically address
but does implicitly raise is what course of action should be taken when two
domain name marks do engender a likelihood of confusion but have not
penetrated the same geographic area. The court recognized in Pizzeria that
injunctive relief is not appropriate where the established mark has not
penetrated the geographic area.49 However, because the worldwide web can
be accessed from anywhere, by anyone, and delivers goods to virtually
43 Falwell v. Lamparello, 126 S. Ct. 1772 (2006).
" Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2005).
45 fd. at 316.
4 Id.
47 Id.
48 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 n.15 (1987).
49 Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1536 (4th Cir. 1984).
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everywhere, it is seemingly one large geographic area. Maintaining a
distinction between geographic areas in cyberspace seems highly impractical.
However, the argument could be made that on-line businesses that only
provide their services to certain geographic areas could not be awarded
injunctive relief on a claim against a similar provider with a similar mark that
engendered a likelihood of confusion, but who only provided business in a
different geographic area. For instance, a local cleaning service company in
Virginia could establish an on-line service for its customers and employ the
same mark as a major cleaning service company in New York with a similar
on-line service. Could either of the companies be awarded injunctive relief?
Given the ubiquity of the internet it seems apparent that an argument
of geographic penetration would not long survive; however, given the local
nature of a plethora of businesses that will be going on-line in the next
decade, such an argument may persist. While the nature of on-line
businesses, such as Amazon.com and eBay, may easily penetrate every
market as soon as it goes on-line, local businesses that wish to meet new
demands of their clients and have no interest or plan of going global will
present the same practical considerations that counseled against the
availability of injunctive relief for non-geographic competition. One
alternative advocated is to develop a jurisprudence that allows concurrent use
of trademarks and imposes court issued modifications to diminish the
likelihood to confusion.5° In any event, this is an issue that the court may
have to grapple with during next several years.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
William O'Brien
50 Robert Nupp, Concurrent Use of Trademarks on the Internet: Reconciling the Concept of
Geographically Delimited Trademarks with the Reality of the Internet, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 617 (2003).

MADISON V. RITER
411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (W.D. Va. 2006)
FACTS
Ira W. Madison is a Virginia inmate held in custody by the Virginia
Department of Corrections (VDOC).' Madison claims to be a "Hebrew
Israelite" which requires him to eat a kosher diet.2 He asserts that his
religious beliefs can be satisfied by the provision of the Common Fare Diet,
available to VDOC inmates upon approval from authorities. Madison
applied twice to receive this diet, but was turned down each time by prison
officials. Madison then brought suit under the Civil Rights Act5 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 6 seeking
monetary and permanent injunctive relief.
7
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to Madison's
First Amendment claims and as to his RLUIPA claims, arguing that the
statute was unconstitutional on several grounds.8 The court granted the
motion as to the First Amendment claims, but denied the motion as to the
RLUIPA claims, and encouraged the parties to settle.9 After no settlement
was reached, the court ruled that RLUIPA violates the Establishment
Clause' o and was therefore unconstitutional." The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for
certiorari as to the Establishment Clause challenge.' 2 The court then heard
arguments from the parties, including the United States as intervener, as to
the remaining constitutional challenges to RLUIPA.
13
HOLDING
Writing for the court, Senior District Judge Turk held that RLUIPA
is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Spending Clause
14




5 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
6 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
7 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648 (W.D. Va. 2006).
a Id. at 649.
9 Id.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (W.D. Va. 2003) (stating that RLUIPA is a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause because it has the primary effect of advancing religion above
other fundamental rights), revd, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2536 (2005).
12 Madison, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
13 Id.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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because it unambiguously conditions frants of federal funds on the
protection of prisoners' religious rights.' The court also determined that
RLUIPA does not impermissibly interfere with the State's sovereign
authority to make religious policy and does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine. 6
ANALYSIS
Section 3 of RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person who is imprisoned
unless the government demonstrates that imposing this burden furthers a
compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.' 7 This applies in any case where such a burden is imposed on any
program or activity that receives federal funding assistance. 18  It is
undisputed that the VDOC receives such assistance and thereby falls within
the reach of RLUIPA.' 9
Defendants first contend that Congress may not use the Spending
Clause to regulate religious policies in state prisons.20  In analysis of this
contention, the court cited to South Dakota v. Dole2 1 which stated that
Congress, under the Spending Clause, may further desired policies by
conditioning the receipt of federal funds on the compliance with its
22directives. The Supreme Court established four limitations on this power:
(1) that Congress use its spending power to further the general welfare; (2)
that Congress state its conditions on the receipt of federal funds
unambiguously; (3) that the conditions be related to the federal interest in
particular programs; and (4) that the conditions be valid under any other
15 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648 (W.D. Va. 2006).
16 Id. at 654, 656.
17 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
Is 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(1).
19 Madison, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
20 Id. at 650.
21 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The Supreme Court considered the issue of
federalism and Congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause. In 1984, Congress passed
legislation withholding a certain percentage of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a
minimum drinking age of 21-years-old. Id. at 205. South Dakota allowed 19-year-olds to purchase beer
containing up to 3.2% alcohol and sued to challenge the federal statute. Id. The Supreme Court held that
Congress had engaged in a valid exercise of its power under the Taxing and Spending clause. Id. at 203.
Congress's spending is subject to four restrictions: first, it must promote "general welfare;" it must be
unambiguous; it should relate to the federal interest in particular national projects; and other constitutional
provisions may supersede conditional grants. Id. at 207-08. However, the Court held that the statute was
not an attempt to induce states to engage in activities that would be unconstitutional, and thus, the
Twenty-first Amendment does not bar conditional grant of funds so as to invalidate the statute. Id. at 210.
The highway funds were merely a pressure on the State to comply, not a compulsion to do so. Id. at 204.
22 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 650 (W.D. Va. 2006) (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 206).
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23constitutional provision. The Supreme Court also noted that any
inducements to take the federal funding must not be coercive in nature.24
The court addressed each of these considerations individually and
concluded that Congress validly exercised its spending power in enacting
RLUIPA. First, the court examined whether RLUIPA promotes the general
welfare. The court deferred to Congress's judgment that RLUIPA was
designed to ensure prisoners' rights to exercise their religious beliefs without
interference by state or local governments.26 Moreover, other courts have
previously held that RLUIPA does promote the general welfare.27 Therefore,
the court concluded that RLUIPA met the first Dole limitation.28
Second, the court addressed whether the RLUIPA conditions are
ambiguous. In determining that the conditions are unambiguous, the court
stated that RLUIPA, on its face, clearly notifies states that if they accept
federal funds, they will be subject to lawsuits if they substantially burden a
prisoner's religious exercise.29 Congress does not have to list all types of
conduct that would be improper, because this condition clearly subjects
states to a duty not to burden prisoners' religious rights.30 Furthermore, other
courts have previously held that this condition is unambiguous.31
Third, the court addressed whether these conditions are related to a
federal interest. A condition on federal funding is constitutional so long as it
is "reasonably calculated to address [an] impediment to a purpose for which
the funds are expended."3 2  The court found that the condition here was
directly related to the purpose of assisting states in rehabilitating their
prisoners.33 Defendants argued that federal funding conditions only apply to
instrumentalities of commerce, but the court rejected this argument by stating
that Dole does not limit the imposition of such conditions on only these
entities. 34 The court cited the Rehabilitation Act35 as an example, which the
Fourth Circuit recently upheld as valid Spending Clause legislation even
23 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
24 Id. at 211.
25 See id. at 207 (stating that in considering whether an expenditure is intended to serve general
public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress).
26 Madison, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
27 Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2005); Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601,607 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002)).
28 Id.
29 Id. (citing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l(a),
l(b)(l), 2(a) (2000)).
30 Id. (citing Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2004)).
31 Id. at 652 (citing Cutter, 423 F.3d at 586; Benning, 391 F.3d at 1305; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d
at 1067).
32 Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987)).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
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though it applies to state agencies which are not instrumentalities of
commerce. 36 Defendants also argued that RLUIPA requires state prisons to
accommodate prisoners' religious beliefs to an extent not required by the
First Amendment. 37 The court stated that while Congress may not use the
spending power to induce states to engage in unconstitutional activities,
Congress may use the spending power to indirectly achieve objectives that it
does not have the power to achieve directly.38  Congress certainly has an
interest in the protection of civil rights and may, under the spending power,
offer financial funding to only those institutions that protect these rights.39
The court, therefore, found that RLUIPA's federal funding conditions are
clearly related to the furtherance of federal interests.40 The court also noted
that other courts have consistently found that RLULPA is reasonably
calculated to address the federal government's interest in the protection of
religious beliefs and conduct.4'
Finally, the court concluded that no other constitutional provision
bars the RLUIPA funding conditions before addressing the concern that the
funding conditions must not be coercive.42 The Fourth Circuit has based its
determination on whether a funding condition is coercive on the degree to
which the institution actually relies on the federal funding in question.43
Consistent with this approach, the court announced that the coercion inquiry
to be made is whether the funds conditioned are so necessary to a state
agency that its only choice is to accept the funds and the attached
conditions.44
In this situation, the VDOC received about $11 million in federal
funds in 2005, an amount representing 1.3% of its total budget of $848
36 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652 (W.D. Va. 2006) (citing Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2005)).
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (stating that the "independent
constitutional bar limitation on the spending power is not a prohibition on the indirect achievement of
objectives that Congress is not empowered to achieve directly, but rather stands for the proposition that
the power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional")).
39 Id. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 492 (stating that Congress under the spending power may
require that "public funds, to which all taxpayers ...contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in ... discrimination." (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 569 (1974))).
40 Madison, 411 F. Supp. at 653.
41 Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Georgia, 391
F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2004); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 2003);
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)).
42 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 653 (W.D. Va. 2006).




million.4 5  Defendants assert that if it lost this 1.3%, Virginia would be
forced to seek out options such as diverting money from other state agencies
or raising taxes in order to make up for the deficit.46 The court, however,
found that the defendants failed to prove that such options are impractical for
the State, and thereby failed to prove that the RLUIPA's funding conditions
47are coercive.
Defendants' second main argument was that RLUIPA impermissibly
interferes with the State's right to make its own religious policy. The court
addressed this argument under the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment. First, the court determined whether RLUIPA
violates the Tenth Amendment. The court stated that the Tenth Amendment
argument must fail on its face, because the court held that RLUIPA is a valid
exercise of Congressional power under the Spending Clause, an enumerated
constitutional power.48 The court also noted that RLUIPA does not require
states to adopt particular religious policies, and that its provisions need not
be followed if the VDOC decided not to accept federal funding.49
Second, the court examined whether the defendants were immune
from this lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment. RLUIPA states that a
person may assert a violation of this Act as a claim in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 50 The court stated that
implicit in this section of RLUIPA was an unambiguous requirement that
states which accept federal funds waive their sovereign immunity from
lawsuits filed under the Act, and thereby found no Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
51
Third, the court analyzed the defendants' claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court found that because RLUIPA's requirements are
rooted in Congress's spending and commerce powers, and because it already
held that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress's spending power, the
defendants' Fourteenth Amendment argument must fail.
5 2
Defendants finally contended that RLUIPA violates the separation of
powers doctrine. The court noted the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, 3 which held that laws of general applicability
45 Id. at 653.
SId. at 654.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 655.
49 Id.
50 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2000).
51 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 656 (W.D. Va. 2006) (citing Benning v. Georgia, 391
F.3d 1299, 1306-07 (11 th Cir. 2004)).
52 Id.
53 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Oregon drug laws applied
to ceremonial ingestion of peyote, thus the state could deny claimants unemployment compensation for
work-related misconduct based on use of the drug regardless of the free exercise clause). In Employment,
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that incidentally burden religious conduct do not violate the First
Amendment. 4 RLUIPA on the other hand sets the standard higher by
requiring that any substantial burden imposed on a prisoner's religious
exercise be justified by a compelling government interest furthered in the
least restrictive means.55  The court stated that the Seventh Circuit had
previously found that RLUIPA did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine.56 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that RLUIPA did
not overturn Smith's holding but rather provided further protection of
religious conduct, respecting that Smith only set a constitutional floor, not a
ceiling, for the protection of personal liberty.57 Smith "explicitly left
heightened legislative protection for religious worship to the political
branches.58
CONCLUSION
The District Court's holding that Congress has properly exercised its
power under the Spending Clause in enacting RLUIPA affirms that Congress
seems to have nearly unlimited power in conditioning funds on any objective
it seeks to achieve. Whether Congress is attempting to condition federal
funds on regulations regarding highway safety,59 education, 6° or most
recently military recruitment,6' the Supreme Court has been very willing to
the Supreme Court considered whether a state can require an individual to comply with a law that forbids
the performance of an act that his religious belief requires. The Court reasoned that as long as the law is
not specifically directed to religious practice then it is constitutional. Id. at 872-74. Respondents Alfred
Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs because they ingested peyote for religious purposes at a
Native American Church ceremony. Their unemployment compensation petition was denied because they
had been fired due to "work-related misconduct" despite the religious motivation. Id. at 874-76. Previous
Supreme Court decisions have stated that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability" because the law bars conduct
that a religion prescribes. Id. at 879.
54 Id. at 879 (stating that the right of free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a neutral law of general applicability).
55 Madison, 411 F. Supp. at 656-57.
56 Id. at 657.
5 Id. (citing Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002)).
58 Id. (quoting Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070).
59 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that 23 U.S.C. § 158, which required
the withdrawal of five percent of the federal highway funds to a State that failed to prohibit anyone under
21 years of age from purchasing or possessing alcohol, was a valid exercise of Congress's spending
power).
60 See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (rejecting a private college's claim that
conditioning its funds on compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments violated the First
Amendment because the college could decline the Government's funds).
61 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (holding
that Congress under the Solomon Amendment could require law schools to provide equal access to
military recruiters without violating the schools' freedoms of speech or association under its spending
power).
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permit Congress to do so. It is no surprise then that this District Court and
numerous Circuit Courts have found that Congress has not exceeded its
spending power in enacting the statute at issue here. Perhaps this is because
the test as enunciated in Dole does not appear to be difficult to satisfy. With
regards to the first prong, the Supreme Court as far back as 1937 stated that
the discretion as to what constitutes "general welfare" belongs to Congress,
unless the choice was clearly wrong and was a display of arbitrary power
rather than an exercise of judgment.62 It appears that as long as Congress has
a reasonably plausible explanation of how its use of the spending power
helps the public at large, its decision-making will not be questioned. The
second prong requires Congress to attach its conditions unambiguously;
surely a clear statement within the statute of what must be done in order to
receive the funds would fulfill this requirement. Concerning the third prong,
Congress need only show that the federal funds are contingent on and related
to a program that is of national interest. As this court stated, Congress
certainly has an interest in the protection of civil rights and has the discretion
to provide funds only to those institutions that protect such rights.63 Finally,
the legislation must not be in violation of any other constitutional provision
and the receipt of the funding must not be coercive in nature. Congress
simply must follow the law of the land and not provide such a significant
amount of funds to a state agency to the point where that agency becomes
fully reliant on those funds because it lacks other options to receive such
money. Congress's Article I spending power is nearly unbridled, as it has
successfully regulated any area it so chooses, and continues to do so.
The District Court's holding is a continued effort by the courts to
uphold RLUIPA on its face and ensure that prisoners' religious beliefs and
conduct for the most part are free from interference. In fact, RLUIPA offers
a level of protection of religious worship that is not even constitutionally
required, and the courts have respected Congress's objectives against several
constitutional challenges brought against the statute. Writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg in Cutter v. Wilkinson upheld
Section 3 of RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge.65
Ginsburg wrote that this section had a legitimate purpose of alleviating
substantial burdens imposed by the government on religious exercise, did not
62 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,640 (1937).
63 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652 (W.D. Va. 2006) (citing Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,492 (4th Cir. 2005)).
( Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). In three different actions, prison officials were sued
by state prisoners who complained that they were denied their right to freely practice their religion. This
came at a time when there were concerns with security in violation of RLUIPA. The Court held that
Section 3 of RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause because it does not impede on state
establishments as no State has an established religion. Id. at 732.
65 Id. at 720.
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elevate the accommodation of religious exercise over an institution's need to
preserve order and safety, and did not treat one faith differently from any
other.66 Ginsburg noted that the Court's holding in Smith did not prevent the
political branches from being able to protect religious exercise through
legislative accommodation.67  This was echoed here when the court
concluded that the legislature did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine because it had the right to expand the protections offered by Smith.68
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit,69 Seventh Circuit,70 Ninth Circuit,71 and
Eleventh Circuit72 also rejected the Spending Clause challenge showing a
developing uniformity amongst the courts throughout the nation. Although
this case is up for an interlocutory appeal, it seems unlikely that the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals will reverse the District Court's holding in light of
how several other circuits have addressed the issue.
Altogether, these cases show that the courts are not only taking
seriously the importance of religion but also ensuring that prisoners are not
being forgotten about or further punished for exercising their religious
beliefs. Religious liberty is not simply a fundamental right, nor simply a
constitutional right, but the "first freedom" mentioned under the First
Amendment that we as U.S. citizens have.7 3 Accordingly, the courts have
permitted Congress to step in and condition federal funding assistance on
allowing prisoners to be free from substantial burdens on their religious
conduct. This is especially important considering that prisoners are a
confined class of people who need outside assistance in order to be able to
exercise some of their constitutional rights. The government must usually
step in when a prisoner seeks to exercise his religious beliefs or observe a
religious holiday.74 The government is thus very much in control and highly
66 Id. at 720-23.
67 Id. at 714 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990)).
69 Madison, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
69 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that RLUIPA is a valid
exercise of Congress's spending power and under the Tenth Amendment).
70 See Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA does not violate
the Establishment Clause and is valid under the Spending Clause).
71 See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenges against
RLUIPA under the Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and
separation of powers doctrine).
72 See Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that RLUIPA is a valid
exercise of Congress's spending power and does not violate the Establishment Clause).
73 See Permissible Accommodation of Religion-Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 119 HARv. L. REV. 238, 246-47 (2005) (stating that religion is privileged in the
Constitution's textual hierarchy and has been discussed as the "first freedom" standing at the core of
liberal democratic ideas).




able to prevent a prisoner from engaging in his religious observance. 75 This
concern has not gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court; instead it was a major
factor in upholding Section 3 of RLUIPA. As Justice Ginsburg emphasized
in Cutter, RLUIPA "protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely
to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the
government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion."7 6 Since the Supreme Court's holding in Cutter, the courts have
continued to reject any and all constitutional challenges to Section 3 of
RLUIPA, and it appears that prisoners, mental patients, or anyone else
institutionalized by a facility accepting federal funds will be able to freely
exercise their religious beliefs.
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75 Id. at 246 (stating that the potential for the government to deprive prisoners of their ability to
engage in religious observance is extremely high).
76 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).

